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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/05/2006

Accident number: 155

Accident time: 08:05

Accident Date: 24/03/1999

Where it occurred: Kapfudze village,
Mukumbura

Country: Zimbabwe

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: KMS

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast

Ground condition: hard

Date record created: 13/02/2004

Date last modified: 13/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
long handtool may have reduced injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
disciplinary action against victim (?)
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Accident report
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a oneman drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while
excavating.
An undated internal accident report was prepared by the Site Supervisor and made available
by the managers of the demining group in April 1999. Another report compiled by the Site
safety officer was made available in December 1999.
Both reports agreed that the victim had located a signal with a Vallon detector and was
investigating it with his prodder when the mine detonated at 08:05. The victim walked unaided
to the base line where he was treated first by the team medic and then by the site doctor.
The Site Supervisor stated that the victim was wearing his protective equipment correctly
(indicated by the extent of injury and the pattern of mud splashes) and was using water to
soften the ground as directed. He believed that the mine was lying on its side (as indicated by
flash burns on one side of the crater).
The Supervisor observed that the victim may have been prodding too close to the marker and
that the Team Leader failed to notice or correct any breaches of SOPs [there was no
suggestion that his partner should have corrected him]. His report stated that the team had
stopped work and would undergo retraining before starting work again. Also that the Team
Leaders would also undergo training in their respective supervision drills.

The Site supervisor recommended that the group find alternative methods for investigating
signals where the ground was hard or mines deeply buried. He observed that the steel safety
clip [galvanised, shown above] was being found away from the mine, so masking the exact
location of the mine.
Deminers could start investigating a signal thinking they were 15cm behind a mine and then
find that they were actually prodding directly onto it. He recommended that prodding should
start 20-25cm behind a signal in future.
The Site safety officer's team found that the victim's water carriers were at the end of his lane
and unused, his apron and visor were dusty, his "marker triangle" [used to ensure that
prodding started at the correct distance from a detector signal] was not used, that the crater
was dry, shallow and "showed no signs that mine might have been tilted". The team checked
the victim's working lane and found seven detector readings that had not been investigated.
They found that the victim was not carrying out drills correctly and believed that the mine was
outside the "row" so the victim had not treated the detector reading seriously and had not
used water to soften the hard ground.

Conclusion
The Site safety officer's team concluded that the victim was negligent. They observed that his
partner did not correct him, and neither did the Team Leader. They added that the fact that he
was wearing his PPE correctly prevented serious injury.
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Actions
The victim, his partner and the Team Leader were all dismissed "to make it very clear that
violations of drills will not be tolerated".

Victim Report
Victim number: 199

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not applicable

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A brief report written by the doctor on site, dated 24th March 1999, was made available. The
doctor stated that he attended the victim at 08:32 for "L. arm lacerations and contusions of a
minor degree". He also stated that the victim was recovering well at camp and that he would
be ready to return to work on 25th March 1999.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
appears to have been working in breach of SOPs when the mine detonated.
The victim's 18" (15cm) prodder (made locally) was bent by the accident but remained in one
piece as it was designed to do.

Several other excavating accidents occurred in this mined area within weeks of this one. The
area being cleared was a dense minefield with over 3000 AP mines per kilometre and as
many as 200 mines being found each working day.
The inconsistencies between the investigations (both by ex-pat senior staff) reveals an
attempt to disguise the failings that led to the accident which is a management failing that the
second investigation – by the Site safety officer – appears to correct.

3

The dismissal of the Field supervisor shows that his responsibility was recognised by the
group’s managers.

Related papers
A covering letter dated 25th March 1999 stated that the victim was injured on his upper left
arm and that he was treated in their "field hospital container".
A notification form to the Zimbabwe Ministry of Defence, undated but signed on behalf of the
demining group, stated that the accident occurred in an "unmarked" area at 08:30. The area
was described as rural woodland. [It was part of the "Ploughshear minefield".]
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